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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This paper argues that we cliometricians have failed as economists, because we did not drag 
the profession out of the nineteenth century and into the twentieth; that we have failed as 
historians, because we do not take measurement seriously, and misapprehend “the data”; and 
that we failed signally as economic historians, because we backcast “GDP” as if it measured 
gross domestic product. 
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SPLEEN:  THE FAILURES OF THE CLIOMETRIC SCHOOL 
 
 
… l’Espoir, 
Vaincu, pleure, et l’Angoisse atroce, despotique, 
Sur mon crâne incliné plante son drapeau noir.  . 
Charles Baudelaire, Spleen 
 
 
 As we all know, “cliometrics” is the originally humorous name applied to what was also 
called the New Economic History.  Humorous, and inexact:  quantification was a mere servant, 
the mistress of the household was economic theory.  That recovery of economic theory was of 
course well overdue, as mainstream economic history was embarrassingly ignorant of it:  the 
throwaway distinction between “economic historians” and “competent economists” by Lionel 
Robbins (1939, p. 9) was harsh but not unjustified.1  
 So it was as economists, proud of our training, that we cliometricians fought our battles, 
against the “old” economic historians, against Polanyi and his epigoni.  The 1978 Journal of 
Economic History included a piece by (then) Donald McCloskey on “The Achievements of the 
Cliometric School”:  a triumphalist piece, well displaying the pride and confidence we felt at 
the time.  
 At the time, as juvenes.  The present pages, penned four decades on, are a counterpoint 
to those.  These are scripta senectutis, but not, I trust, another threnody, another complainte that 
the discipline is no longer what it used to be, another confession, in fact, that as the discipline 
evolved the author was left behind.  Nor are they yet another tiresome outsider’s attack on the 
principles that define the cliometric approach:  I confirm my faith in them, and would never 
deny that we, as a school, have contributed much and have much more to contribute.  But to 
my mind our collective practice has fallen short of our principles, and to a church door I nail 
these theses:  that we cliometricians have failed as economists, that we have failed as historians, 
that we have failed as economic historians. 
I now believe, in sorrow and in anger, that we fought the wrong battles:  not because the 
“old” economic history and the Polanyi approach were not to be condemned, but because they 
were doomed in any case by their own obvious deficiencies; because in fighting the enemy 
without we overlooked the more insidious enemy within, the inherited weaknesses in our own 
intellectual baggage.  It took four years of graduate work to train me as an economist; I have 
spent the succeeding fifty trying to train myself as a historian. 
 
 
1.  Our failure as economists   
 
 We contemporary economists are proud of our discipline, our “queen of the social 
sciences,” our economic science.  We practice it as scientists:  we favor powerful, parsimonious 
                                                 
    1 The “New Economic History” traces its roots to the Meyer and Conrad (1958) paper on slavery.  That 
was the voyage of Columbus:  well earlier Luigi Einaudi (1936a, p. 158) had insisted that economic 
history should use the most up-to-date tools provided by economic theory, but his example was not 
followed, and it remained Leif Erikson’s voyage to Vinland.  The “new” economic historians knew 
nothing of Einaudi:  Schumpeter, who did, had died years earlier, and Gerschenkron was a poor 
substitute (much given to advertising his European culture but something of a bluff, and taken aback 
when I pointed out that the Einaudi he cited was actually Luigi and not Giulio; see Gerschenkron 1962, 
pp. 84-85). 
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models, we use mathematics, we test our hypotheses against empirical evidence, against “the 
facts.”2  We produce it as scientists:  we publish peer-reviewed articles, we embrace 
bibliometric scores.  We teach it as a science:  the history of economic thought is not part of the 
core curriculum, it is mere antiquarianism as useless to an economist as a study of Ptolemaic 
epicycles to an astronomer or of Hippocratic humors to a physician.  Leading economists have 
been heard to brag that they have their students read nothing over three years old; in the early 
1960s I myself heard Paul Samuelson declare that “any graduate student today is a better 
economist than Keynes.”3 
 My layman’s take on this is the following.  One, we humans seek status, if only because 
“in the environment of our evolution” higher status meant greater reproductive success (Wright 
1994):  economists consider themselves scientists, and want to be seen as scientists, for the 
status, the prestige that label confers.  Two, with her self-inflicted World Wars Europe lost her 
economic and military hegemony, and in good part her cultural hegemony too, which passed to 
the United States (and a Good Thing too, given the alternatives Europe offered up by the 1930s); 
economics in particular has become overwhelmingly American, and Europe’s doctoral 
programs now mimic American models.  Three, the attribution of the highest prestige to science 
is a peculiarly American trait, only America could spawn a Church of Scientology.  This no 
doubt reflects a pioneering society’s natural concern for the practical; methinks it also 
specifically reflects modern America’s (consequent?) abandonment of classical education.  In 
Europe, “in the environment of my own evolution,” the bright kids did classics, the scientific 
curriculum was for second-raters.  And in Western culture at large the greatest of the greats, 
those known by their first name alone, are (hairdressers aside) not scientists but artists:  we 
remember Raphael, we remember Michelangelo (but the less eminent Vasari), we do not 
remember Enrico, or Albert, or Marie.4  In short, economics now presents itself as a science 
because it has become American:  the discipline has internalized values that are distinctly 
American and, on a broader stage, distinctly provincial.5 
                                                 
    2 Thus the canon, but it is hard to see what is peculiarly “scientific” about it.  The human mind, every 
last one of us, favors powerful, parsimonious models:  think of the fellow who discards the complex set 
of hypotheses that supposedly explain his wife’s repeated tardiness in returning home from work in 
favor of the single, powerful hypothesis that she is seeing somebody else.  Mathematics are a wonderful 
tool, an inherently error-proof way to draw out the implications of one’s assumptions, as effort-saving 
as power steering.  The testing of hypotheses that “as scientists” we can reject or not reject, but never 
“accept,” is instead so much cant:  we do not consider Archimedes’ principle a “not (yet) rejected 
hypothesis,” we accept it as fact, a law of nature (and we write to have our hypotheses accepted by the 
reader, McCloskey 1983).  Many of our facts are actually no more than beliefs, but more on this anon. 
 
    3 Jean-Christian Lambelet was also present (at a graduate class at Harvard ca. 1964, where Samuelson 
appeared as a guest lecturer), and confirms the episode.  I remember it clearly because I was appalled 
by his sense of the discipline:  to my mind he might as well have said “any art student today is a better 
painter than Raphael,” presumably because we now have acrylic paints. 
 
    4 My own take, as the reader will have gathered, is that to consider me a scientist diminishes me:  I 
cannot be considered an artist, but want to be considered at least a craftsman, with technical skills but 
also a creative, aesthetic dimension that makes me unique and not fungible.  And once we recognize the 
aesthetic dimension of our “scientific” creations, we see invasive peer review for the aberration that it 
is:  “We will hang your Mona Lisa in our museum, Mr. da Vinci, but only if you correct her mouth so 
that she bares her teeth as she smiles.”  O tempora! O mores! 
 
    5 As those who know me know, I am at once, and in roughly equal parts, both American and Italian:  
all my criticism, whithersoever directed, is in principle self-criticism (unless, Italian-born, I simply 
inherited the House of Savoy’s practice of choosing its allegiances from case to case and moment to 
moment, ever ready to rat, and re-rat, as circumstances warrant). 
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 But America is distinctive, and provincial, in other ways as well, only America could 
spawn a Joe McCarthy.  Only Americans approve of capitalism, everywhere else it is a dirty 
word:  no European with even a folk memory of history, no European who has read Zola can 
do more than accept capitalism reluctantly as the least bad practical alternative, can view the 
failure of more ambitious schemes as anything but tragedies for the human race.  Successful 
European leaders sold communism, socialism, national socialism, corporativism; capitalism, 
as such, had no mass constituency at all.6  In Europe, Marxism is respected, if only for the 
nobility of its aspirations; in America it is anathema.  American economists are not exposed to 
the Marxist literature, they never see themselves called bourgeois economists, never hear the 
warning that they are sectarian, imprisoned by their beliefs, more nearly religious thinkers than 
scientists; even less do they grasp how much they play into the Marxists’ hand as they proscribe 
their writings, as they avoid reading heresy to maintain the purity of their faith.  Only in America 
could economists want to be considered scientists, only in America could they stop their ears 
with wax and not hear anything to the contrary; only we American economists, we 
Americanized economists, could be so provincial. 
 We economists are not only provincials, we are primitives.  Our view of our “science” 
is that of nineteenth-century positivists, blithely confident that we can observe reality, establish 
“the facts.”  Western culture, led by French literary criticism and philosophy, has meanwhile 
moved beyond that, to postmodernism.  By now we all know – all of us, save only those entirely 
cut off from our broader culture – that our vision of reality is inevitably distorted by our biases 
and prejudices, that we see our facts through the prism of our theories; the more radical among 
us doubt the very existence of the objective reality an economist might wish to observe, an 
historian to reconstruct.  We know that our social “sciences” are not the cumulation of objective 
knowledge, but the contemporary form of the stories our distant forefathers would tell when 
they gathered around the campfire.7  Our theories, our facts – our stories, like their stories – are 
constructs that define and project an image of ourselves; they are shaped by fears and 
aspirations so deep we do not admit them to our conscious minds, by prejudices so strong we 
do not recognize them (Fenoaltea 2011, p. xix).8 
 The most obvious case in point is our history of the human race.   In the nineteenth 
century England and the Western World experienced mass progress, that had been all but 
inconceivable.  Progress became the new religion:  in Its name, as formerly in that of the True 
Faith, the West justified colonial conquest and the new imperialism.  That same faith defined Man 
as the tool-maker (not the picture-painter, or story-teller, or god-worshiper, or clothes-wearer, or 
anything else, equally distinctive); it defined the past as the history of progress, specifically of 
technical progress, of that particular progress that was the pride and miracle of the West.  The 
                                                 
    6 The aforecited Luigi Einaudi was a classical liberal; but he was in favor of high inheritance taxes 
(confiscatory over very few generations, in the absence of further, successful enterprise).  If capitalism 
is, as Schumpeter defined it, the civilization of the family fortune, even Einaudi was against capitalism. 
 
    7 Our forefathers, our male ancestors.  My sense is that history was always male history not because 
of our dominance, but to compensate for our weakness.  The female, the ovum, the queen bee are rare 
and precious, the key to the survival of the species; males, sperm cells, drones are vastly superabundant, 
as worthless (at the margin) as any superabundant resource.  Only we males felt the need to invent stories 
to glorify ourselves, to give a meaning to our essentially pointless existence; to be female was glory 
enough (again, e.g., Wright 1994). 
 
    8 The closer a subject if to our hearts, the less we can view it objectively:  to an informed mind a 
“social science” is an oxymoron, a contradiction in terms.  The same problem once plagued the natural 
sciences:  we will never know whether Copernicus was the first with the genius to see the explanatory 
power of the heliocentric model, or merely the first to combine that genius with a misanthropic willingness 
to demote mankind from its rightful place at the center of God’s creation. 
4 
 
triumph of that ideology has been complete:  we absorb it in our grade-school texts, we have no 
mental categories to describe the vast sweep of human history other than the stages of 
technological progress, from the “stone age” on.  But this is only an interpretation of history, the 
Whig interpretation of history, an interpretation (“palpably”) designed to portray us, we modern 
Westerners,  as the pinnacle of human accomplishment.9   
 Anthropology has kept pace with Western culture – in America too, thanks perhaps to the 
independent strength of the discipline in France:  anthropologists realized decades ago that 
“progress” and “the primitive” are notions we modern Westerners invented to glorify ourselves, 
and spent a suitable number of years deconstructing their discipline.10  Economics has instead 
been left behind, in splendid isolation; isolation is the royal road to inbreeding, inbreeding the 
royal road to retardation.  That isolation again reflects the American dominance of the discipline, 
the lack of the European counterweight that may have rescued anthropology; it also reflects, 
methinks, the structure of American higher education.  In small colleges the relatively few 
economists perforce rub shoulders with colleagues in other disciplines, and develop, in my 
experience, interestingly complex minds.  But the tone and nature of the discipline are set by the 
stars of the profession in the leading research universities, the “multiversities,” as that barbarous 
neologism has them.11  There economists are numerous, Economics Departments typically have 
their own buildings; our leading economists can spend their entire working lives never talking to 
anyone who is not in fact a carbon copy of themselves.  We economists are self-referential, we 
set our own fashions, we continue to wear our narrow ties when all around us have abandoned 
theirs.  Push the metaphor, think of the world’s intelligentsia meeting as Ascot race-goers in the 
1930s:  magnificently elegant, the epitome of sophistication.  And there in a corner of the 
grandstand we find the economists, a rowdy group in coveralls, engaged in our own contest, the 
spitting of watermelon seeds.  How do we appear, if not as yokels?  How could we avoid the 
broader community’s bemusement, horror, and withering contempt?  To be an economist today, 
in a company that is not restricted to our fellow economists, is to suffer embarrassment. 
 A counterfact comes readily to mind.  Only we cliometricians are at once trained 
economists respected by economists, and professionally tied to history, to the humanities, to the 
broader culture of the West.  It was our duty to the profession, for no other economists could do 
                                                 
    9 On the Whig interpretation, now undermined, see Fenoaltea (2006).  To Whig eyes everything that 
brought humanity closer to Us was progress.  We have agriculture, its invention was progress; we have a 
Church and a State, their creation meant progress; we have money and markets, their development came 
with progress; our many Revolutions, political and economic, were all steps in the path of progress.  To 
me the eye-opener was, perhaps paradoxically, Polanyi (1944).  I grew up an orthodox Whig – Fisher 
(1936) was long my livre de chevet – and on a first reading, in college, The Great Transformation merely 
puzzled me.  Some years later a dim bulb sent me back to it, and I grasped its deeper import:  simply by 
not seeing the “capitalist revolution” as progress Polanyi showed that the contrary view was not fact but 
(an alternative, also ideologically-charged) interpretation. 
 
    10 I witnessed that at first hand at the Institute for Advanced Study, in 1987-88.  A concentration of 
economic historians had been invited the previous year (omitting me, to my humiliation).  When I was 
there I was the lone economic historian; the mass of annual visitors was made up of anthropologists, and 
theirs were the seminars I attended.  All were introspective, a reflection on the nature of the discipline; and 
I believe I benefited far more from that crash course in deconstruction than I could have from a year with 
my fellow cliometricians. 
 
    11 In Italy, universities are called the università degli studi of this or that city:  not a pleonasm, but a 
recognition that when our universities were born “university” meant association, guild, that the university 
of those who studied set itself apart from the universities of those who baked bread, butchered animals, 
whatever. 
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it, to cultivate those external ties, to bring contemporary culture into our Departments of 
Economics, to drag our economist colleagues out of the nineteenth century and into the twentieth.  
We have done nothing of the sort.  We have restricted our fréquentations to other economists, 
joined them in spitting watermelon seeds; we have become and remained economists pure and 
simple (in both senses of the word).  We have become no more than economists who deal with 
yesterday’s numbers rather than today’s:  economists without an independent contribution to the 
field, necessary perhaps to staff some undergraduate courses, but of very low priority in filling 
senior positions. 
 To our shame and cost we cliometricians have totally neglected the most important 
contribution we could have made to economics:  we have failed as economists. 
 
 
2.  Our failure as historians 
 
 Historians who were not consciously apologists aimed no doubt to portray the past wie 
es eigentlich gewesen.  The evolution of our culture has destroyed our comforting faith in the 
attainability of that goal; but that loss should affect our scholarly self-esteem more than our 
scholarly practice, we should still reconstruct the facts to the best of our ability, however 
conscious we may be of the epistemological limits to that ability.  But as a profession, we 
cliometricians do not do so at all:  as a profession, astonishingly, incredibly, we hold the past 
in contempt, and care little for the facts.  As a profession, our emphasis is all on the sophisticated 
manipulation of the data, not at all on the quality of the data themselves:  we pride ourselves 
on, and reward each other for, the cut of our silk purses, whether the material is thread of 
bombyx mori or sow’s ear does not concern us at all. 
 We are, in this too, economists.  That economists hold the reconstruction of the facts – 
measurement, in our naturally quantitative discipline – in low esteem has been noted, and 
eloquently lamented, by Richard Easterlin (2004); and his complaint is supported by 
overwhelming evidence.  The coin in which we reward the research we value is publication; in 
my own experience almost every article that sought to establish “the facts” by proper 
measurement – typically pointing out the methodological errors of common practice, and how 
these distorted “the data” we use – was rejected by the flagship Anglo-American and pan-
European journals to which I submitted them, with suitable expressions of disinterest.12  One 
referee advised the author to “put his series on his web-site”:  as if measurement were idiots’ 
work that doesn’t merit journal space, or even peer review. 
 The prevalence of that view is confirmed by further evidence, anecdotal and general.  
Decades ago, as newly minted economics Ph.D.s, Joe Reid and I were both involved in the 
University of Pennsylvania’s doctoral program in economic history.  Many students were first-
rate, and went on to distinguished careers; but others were not.  Joe and I, with the unthinking 
cruelty of youth, frequently advised those who seemed incapable of grasping basic theory to leave 
the program, which they could not possibly complete; the standard response was “I’ll do a 
measurement thesis,” as in “even granting for the sake of argument that I am an idiot, I can earn 
my doctorate doing idiots’ work.”  Easterlin himself played in that program a far more senior, 
influential role than we; but that was the prevailing attitude, all the same.13 
                                                 
    12 I refer here to sector-specific reconstructions (and not to the comprehensive “national accounts,” 
discussed below).  Fenoaltea (1982), in the Journal of Economic History, is an exception that proves the 
rule:  if memory serves McCloskey had just inherited the Journal from the previous editor, who proudly 
told him he had worked off the queue of manuscripts in process, and left him scrambling for papers.  
The crisis over, he too rejected such material (with his customary grace, but that is beside the point). 
 
13 An eye-witness account of our misdeeds can be obtained for example from Elyce Rotella 
(rotella@indiana.edu). 
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 A decade or so later, the National Science Foundation refused to renew a generous grant 
that allowed me to pursue my research in Italy; the referee’s complaint was that it was pointlessly 
expensive for me to “collect the data” myself, as a mere research assistant could as readily do it 
in my stead.  That referee was a representative economist.  Weaned on pap and raised on pabulum, 
the pabulum of ready-made, government-supplied statistics, economists believe historical data 
are simply to be found, photocopied, and uploaded, that measurement requires no more than the 
most elementary human skills.  It was not always so – more on that later – but it has been so now 
for generations:  most serious efforts to reconstruct the past, to measure, are first efforts, one-offs, 
typically their authors’ doctoral dissertation (after which they turn to more publishable work); 
certainly in all research projects the P.I.s reserve the analysis unto themselves, and leave the 
preparation of “the data” to their r.a.s.  Measurement, the provision of “the data” for the 
subsequent analyses, is (overwhelmingly) the work of unskilled beginners:  because it is 
considered work suitable for the unskilled, in the vernacular for idiots. 
 Nothing could be further from the truth.  Historians know that their sources are complex 
constructs, opaque to the inexpert, often meretricious, that one learns to extract their factual 
content only slowly, through long exposure.  The quantitative sources we cliometricians use are 
no different, save that they are utterly treacherous:  they present numbers clearly labelled in our 
native language, they positively invite us to take them at face value.  And so we do, at our peril:  
to take an example from my own field of study, there is a long literature that takes Italy’s 
industrial employment in 1911 directly from that year’s industrial census, never cottoning to its 
gross incompleteness (Fenoaltea 2015, 2016, and references therein).  Our quantitative “data,” 
like the historians’ documents, are constructs that must be deconstructed if their relationship to 
“the facts” is to be understood at all.  We must determine by whom, to what purpose, and how 
they were derived, we must scrutinize them closely for clues to inconsistency, evaluate them in 
the light of ancillary evidence and indeed of everything we know:  we must live them and 
breathe them, to discover the hidden defects that surface only with extended cohabitation.14 
 The historical data must be vetted, the Italian sources on which I have worked provide 
myriad examples, of diverse origin and content.  The ore mined at Agordo was counted first as 
sulphur ore, later as iron pyrite; silk production was so badly underestimated that reported 
output didn’t even cover net exports; the exceptionally low expenditure on public works in 1871 
was a fiction due to an accounting change; the zero office space attributed to Ferrara in the 1911 
room census reveals that the counted rooms were only those in residential buildings (Fenoaltea 
1988a, p. 120; 1988b, p. 278; 1986, p. 7; 2017a, p. 36); and so on and on.15 
 Add to this that all too frequently the desired data do not exist at all.  The time-honored 
gambit, in estimating production series, is to have the documented components represent the 
entire sector:  a fool’s gambit, that survives only because we “cliometricians” do not take 
measurement seriously.  A moment’s thought reveals that the procedure is doubly absurd:  
because “sectors” are arbitrary, and because industries producing substitutes may react 
similarly to demand shocks, but certainly not to industry-specific supply shocks.  Imagine, to 
simplify things, that the only textile industries process cotton and linen; that neither is covered 
by output data; and that the apparent consumption of raw materials documents the growth of 
the first (because raw cotton is imported), but not of the second (because flax is home-grown).  
The growth of the textile sector is therefore represented by that of the cotton industry, in effect 
assuming that the linen industry matched its growth.  A more palpably wrong-headed 
                                                 
    14 Economist economic historians once knew that too:  Luigi Einaudi, the self-same one, warned us of 
exactly that (Einaudi 1936b, p. 7), but here too his teaching was forgotten. 
 
    15 The auxiliary sources that may answer the questions raised by the data cannot be identified before 
those questions come up at all, whence the need to work on the data where such sources can be turned 
to as needed; the obtuseness of the above-cited referee for NSF still rankles. 
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assumption is hard to imagine:  we know from our “old” economic histories that the cotton 
industry was the first to be mechanized, that the linen industry was successfully mechanized 
over a century later; that technological change did not affect the cotton and linen industries 
together, but long favored the first at the expense of the second.  That they could have grown 
in tandem beggars belief; but we cliometricians do not care for the facts, measurement does not 
interest us, whatever is available is good enough for our econometrics. 
 The observed paths, documented by direct evidence, cannot represent the unobserved 
paths; the latter must be estimated as best one can by using indirect evidence.  Logically, this 
is equivalent to locating an unobserved point in space by identifying constraints that exclude 
subspaces where it cannot be, or define loci where it has to be; it is essentially the logic of 
celestial navigation, save that the relevant stars are neither obvious nor tabulated.  It takes a 
good, trained eye to identify the evidence at all, an Indian scout to see tracks where the cowboy 
sees only dust, a Holmes to see clues where Watson sees nothing, an old county vet to sort out 
the symptoms of the beast and reach the correct diagnosis.  Change the metaphor, think of 
measurement as an engineering problem, the building of a bridge to span a gap in our knowledge:  
the engineer must identify the points in the terrain that can support it, and imagine the structure 
that exploits them.  A richer set of supporting points allows a richer set of structures, and a richer 
set of structures allows the exploitation of a richer set of supporting points; both steps depend 
heavily on the creative powers, and experience, of the engineer.  Set metaphor aside:  the 
reconstruction of the past from our poor stock of inherited evidence reflects the observer’s feel, 
intuition, above all knowledge – of the broader corpus of historical sources, of economic logic, 
of the relevant technology, institutions, and mores; it reflects, in a word, the observer’s talents 
and experience.16   
 Four conclusions can immediately be drawn.  The first is that measurement – arguably 
the most critical part of our (historians’) craft, for it defines “the facts” that will then be interpreted 
– is difficult, uncertain, highly personal work:  much more so than the subsequent analysis, 
facilitated and constrained by codified economic theory and econometric technique.  The 
second follows immediately.  When we P.I.s work on the measures provided by our r.a.s, we 
do not work on the evidence, on “the facts,” but on an idiosyncratic rendition of the facts, 
idiosyncratic if the r.a. tried in fact to reconstruct the past, idiosyncratic too, and as noted idiotic, 
if the r.a. merely vacuumed up the surviving (meretriciously) direct evidence:  we may be 
master story-tellers, but if what we are given to work with involves three pigs and a wolf, we 
will never come up with Henry V.  We accept these constraints, one presumes, because we do 
not recognize them at all; and we do not recognize them because we are so little concerned with 
measurement, with getting “the facts” right before we proceed with our elegant (hi)stories.  The 
third is related.  Theory and technique are as noted codified; and we teach our students well, 
without holding back the secrets of our trade.  It follows that our juniors are as well-equipped 
as we are (if not better, given their sharper wit) to process “the data,” to spin a story that fits 
and “explains” them; but only we their elders, suitably engaged, can trump them on experience, 
do much better than they can in conjuring up “the data” in the first place.  We are economists, 
we teach and presumably understand comparative advantage, yet our behavior violates our very 
teaching; forgive us, for we know not what we do.  The fourth brings us back to our starting 
point:  the thread that runs through all this is that we cliometricians behave as economists, 
unconcerned with establishing “the facts” because we expect to have “the data” handed to us 
ready-made.  With such a mind-set, we could hardly recognize, and avoid, our failure as 
historians.  
 
 
                                                 
    16 See for example the evolution of the author’s estimates for the engineering industry, recounted in 
Fenoaltea (2017b).  Quam possum facio – and no, Virginia, we are not discussing marsupials.  
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3.  Our failure as economic historians 
 
 Our failure as economic historians has again to do with measurement, this time with our 
measure of the economy as a whole, what we call Gross Domestic Product:  familiarly, GDP.  
Long ago, when teaching Economics 1 in the United States, I would end my presentation of the 
national income accounts with the question, “why does the U.S. have the world’s highest per-
capita product?” (as it then was).  The students answered with obvious references to advanced 
technology, abundant resources, “capitalist” efficiency (no comsymps there).  Those reasons, I 
would answer, were true but superficial:  “the real reason,” I would say, “is that the measure was 
invented here.”  The point, of course, was that measured income was not a fact but a construct, 
one of many possible constructs.17 
 Our particular construct was defined by its particular genesis:  who built it, to what 
purpose, and of what materials.  The U.S. national accounts appeared in utero in the 1930s at 
Wesley Clair Mitchell’s National Bureau of Economic Research, an institution marked at once 
by its atheoretical approach, and by its specific interest in cyclical fluctuations (e.g., Lerner 1947); 
they emerged as official statistics in the U.S. shortly thereafter, and world-wide, essentially on 
the American model, in the aftermath of the Second World War.18  They came of age in a world 
marked by the Great Depression, when it was widely believed that mature capitalism tended 
inevitably to crisis and mass unemployment, that rearmament and war had been only momentary, 
dreadful remedies, that the next great slump was just around the corner.  Governments therefore 
took on the task of stabilizing the business cycle, and maintaining employment, with the tools 
suggested by the General Theory; but to employ them to good effect they needed timely evidence 
on the path of the economy.  The national accounts were to provide that evidence, with minimal 
delay:   they had to be calculated quickly, even if approximately, using statistics that were already 
available or easily obtained; they were to document the current path of the economy, its likely 
impact on paid employment.  
 The official accounts were shaped by Simon Kuznets, a protégé of Mitchell’s.  In his 
measure Kuznets included all agricultural production, for the market and not, because the 
available data were based on observed acreages and yields.  He included industrial production 
only for the market, and counted its value added, or its value, depending on what data were 
already provided by the Department of Commerce.19  Of the services Kuznets again counted 
                                                 
    17 This was before my year at the Institute, and no, I was not a protopostmodernist.  Altogether more 
simply, I think, our (culture-bound) constructs serve the hegemonic group, typically a national patriarchy.  
Those who identify with that group have no reason to question those comforting constructs, but to outsiders 
(in this case, my Italian side) they do not ring true, and appear altogether more readily as the tendentious 
stories they are than as the facts they purport to be.  That the scholars who undermined the Whig 
interpretation were disproportionately women (and from small countries) is not, to my mind, a coincidence 
(Fenoaltea 2006).  
 
    18 The success of the American model again owed more to hegemony than to technical merit.  Istat (1957) 
had followed the Italian conventions, and excluded intermediate government services from aggregate final 
product; the Fuà team was funded by the Ford Foundation, and their estimates included them (Fuà 1969), 
as do our more recent ones. 
    19 For most industry the Department had long (and laboriously) evolved measures of value added 
(Fenoaltea 1976); but the Department lacked information on the value of the sub-soil resources the 
extractive industries consumed, and Kuznets simply counted the mining firms’ sales rather than their value 
added.  The drawing-down of (underground) stocks is simply ignored; in strict logic, the mining sector is 
treated as if the goods it sells were created out of thin air rather than extracted (Fenoaltea 2005, pp. 306-
307), whence of course the sky-high per-capita “product” of oil-producing deserts.  To be precise, in the 
national accounts the mining firms’ “value added” is computed by deducting from sales only the cost of 
purchased fuel and similar ancillary materials.  An analogous “value added” for the transportation 
industries would deduct from the (c.i.f.) delivered value of the goods only the cost of purchased fuel and 
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those sold on the (legal) market, but also the imputed rental value of owner-occupied housing, 
again because the underlying ready-made statistics refer, as in the case of agriculture, to the 
aggregate stock.  Nada mas:  Kuznets gave us an empirical aggregate to solve a practical problem, 
a creature of the Bureau with no theoretical basis at all.  It is not a measure of anything, it is at 
best a rough index of paid-employment-generating production, an even rougher index of total 
product:  and that in the short run, when the ceteris paribus clause may be a reasonable 
approximation.20  It is not a fact, not an observation, but a construct, in fact a muddy one, good 
enough for government work. 
 And government work it became.  A hundred years ago, the aspiration of the profession 
to empirical relevance led to the creation of The Review of Economic Statistics.  That title 
contained a research program:  the profession was asking itself what measures we wished to 
have, and how to construct them.  Within thirty years that search was abandoned, that flag 
hauled down, that journal blandly renamed (“The Review of Economics and Statistics”):  
national and supranational bureaucracies took on the task of producing (and refining) Kuznets’ 
measure, and the economics profession left to them not only the administrative burden of 
collecting and processing the raw data, inevitably theirs, but the intellectual burden of defining 
the appropriate statistics, quintessentially ours.21  What we do in the small, when we P.I.s take 
“the data” from our r.a.s, we do in the large, as a profession:  our economic “science” did not 
jealously reserve unto itself the generation of its empirical evidence, we altogether relinquished 
responsibility for our “data.”  The only parallel that comes to mind is astrology. 
 Kuznets rendered the profession a great service, and a great disservice:  he called his 
construct not “an index of predominantly market-oriented, paid-employment-generating 
economic activity,” as he could and perhaps should have, not even “an index of gross domestic 
product,” which seems the least demanded by intellectual honesty, but, notoriously, “gross 
domestic product” tout court (actually “gross national product,” at the time, but that is here 
irrelevant).  Kuznets himself knew perfectly well what it was:  he was aware of its cultural 
specificity, and used it intelligently, for example seeing the post-bellum cost of the World Wars 
in the loss of GDP from unemployment in the wake of the First, and the diversion of GDP to 
armaments in the wake of the Second.22    
 Not so, however, the profession at large.  We all know that GDP falls if a man marries 
his housekeeper, even if there is no change in her activities (honi soit qui mal y pense), in her 
product, and therefore in total product, ceteris paribus; we all know, or should know, that 
“GDP” is not the measure its label suggests.  But in all our empirical work we use GDP to 
                                                 
the like, and include the (f.o.b.) value of the goods at the point of origin.  This mixing of value added and 
value demonstrates that the national accounts do not consistently measure production on a value added 
basis to avoid duplication (and sensitivity to vertical integration), as we tell our students:  the underlying 
motivation was not theoretical but practical. 
 
    20 The services of owner-occupied housing generate product but not paid employment; make-work 
projects, digging holes and refilling them, generate paid employment but no product; and so on, about 
which more below.  A specialized index of paid employment and a specialized index of production are 
different tools; Kuznets’ all-purpose Swiss army knife does everything, badly. 
 
    21 With exceptions (returned to below) that were exceptions, and confirm the rule. 
 
    22 “[Kuznets] recognized that at very high levels of per capita product, preferences for leisure and 
immaterial products omitted by NIPA [the national income and product accounts] might come to 
predominate in an economy...  Other items omitted from the NIPA accounts included improvements in 
health and increases in longevity...” (Fogel 2000; also, e.g., Higgs 1992).  It was no doubt Kuznets’ 
confidence in his ability to see through his measure of GDP that led him simply to extrapolate it when his 
interests turned to long-term growth. 
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measure aggregate economic performance, I have never heard of a paper rejected by a journal 
for doing so.  Why we so (mis)use the published “GDP” statistics I do not know.  Does the 
practice derive from a tacit conspiracy, do we peer reviewers forgive each other’s sins to our 
mutual advantage?  Does it derive from our religious approach, which much evidence suggests, 
to (“bourgeois”) economics?23  Do we too believe in transubstantiation, that a statistic 
consecrated as a measure of gross product becomes that very thing?  Do we too presume, more 
generally, that the faithful are only to accept the dictates of the clergy?24  Or does our practice 
reflect, as other evidence suggests, the literal-mindedness of the verbally challenged, of those 
who do not grasp the complex relation between words and concepts because they never 
struggled, in their formative years, with Latin and Greek?25  The cause is obscure, but the effect 
is clear enough:  an economist is one who uses a government-issue screwdriver to hammer nails 
because it says HAMMER right on the handle. 
 We economic historians, in particular, have no interest in an index of the economy’s 
current path, in “GDP.”  We want to gauge the evolution of economies over decades and more, 
we want to compare them to each other as well as to themselves earlier or later; and to do that 
we need a proper measure of the economy’s product, a measure of the opportunity set, in goods-
space, it made available to those then alive (over their expected lives, at that, and not in any one 
year, think of the later fourteenth century).  A number of considerations come immediately to 
mind.  Market exchange and paid employment are, as such, simply irrelevant (Pollak 1985):  
our measure must count unpaid “family production” (typically the work of women, there is 
more than one battle to be fought here), the unpaid services of durables, including both 
consumer durables (not just owner-occupied housing but also, e.g., the appliances that allowed 
housewives to work also outside the home, Gordon 2016) and common-use infrastructure (the 
piazzas their Italian “owner-occupiers” enjoy daily, and Americans cross an ocean to see, which 
is of course where I came in), and obviously leisure (corrected for morbidity); and it must count 
the all-important gifts of nature, that vary from time to time and place to place.  By the same 
token, our measure must exclude not just product-less make-work projects but “social 
intermediates” (armaments, by extension the police and the judiciary, perhaps the legal 
                                                 
    23It is as a religion that we defend it, that Marx is anathema has already been noted.  Near a decade ago, 
the European Review of Economic History, Fid. Def., drew the line very clearly:  of my submitted paper 
the Review would publish the orthodox reconstruction of the expenditure-side accounts (since published 
elsewhere as Fenoaltea 2012), but not the heterodox call for a proper measure (largely reproduced here, 
and after hanging so long perhaps rather high).  All this in the name of peer review, as Galileo also 
encountered.  
    24At the 2006 Bergen Workshop on Historical Accounts I argued, as I am doing here, that we should 
abandon conventionally-defined GDP in favor of a more reasonable measure.  One colleague’s response 
was “We must take our criteria from Eurostat”:  it is not for the faithful to define the faith. 
    25 See the literal interpretation of “real” that plagues the entire literature on “real” measures of product, 
save the contributions of the classically educated (e.g., Sims 1969, Arrow 1974; contrast Fenoaltea 1976, 
Fuà 1993).  See also Easterlin (1974), which fails to recognize how words function, that “happy” is a 
word like “tall,” that progress can no more raise the mean self-evaluation over time than it can bring 
everybody into the top quintile of the current distribution.  See too, on a broader canvas, the great 
controversies internal to the cliometric school, on the “importance” of railroads and the “efficiency” of 
slavery, both sparked by, and giving Nobel-winning resonance to, the work of Robert Fogel:  both in 
fact false controversies Fogel provoked by apparently intentional obfuscation, by verbal sleights of hand 
his (“verbally challenged”) critics did not see through (Fenoaltea 1981).  Fogel was a scholar of 
exceptional background (years in the Communist Party), exceptional ability, exceptional ambition – and 
arguably, in furthering his career, an exceptional lack of ethical scruple (he once told me he published 
his claims with minimal supporting evidence, keeping his stronger results in reserve, so as to invite 
criticism and then win the subsequent argument). 
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professions), and allow for negative externalities:  production externalities (environmental costs, 
including if we want to count it here the reduction of our subsoil assets), and consumption 
externalities too, those caused both by congestion (the crush of tourists that has rendered our 
favorite piazzas quite unlivable) and by social rivalry (which turns increasing consumption into 
a zero-sum game, Veblen 1899, and may well destroy much of what we call “modern economic 
growth”).26 
 Some of the above points are of course long familiar, made even by eminent mainstream 
economists (most famously Nordhaus and Tobin 1972; also Kuznets himself, above, footnote 22; 
also, e.g., Baran 1957); but what is striking is the broader literature.  Even the improvements 
proposed by some of the best of us fell finally on deaf ears, the deaf ears of our profession:  
envers et malgré tout the measure of “GDP” we economists use has remained Kuznets’, with 
the touch of lipstick added by the bureaucrats.27  And in that broader literature the cliometric 
school is the dog that didn’t bark:  as a school we should have been the spearhead of a 
movement to develop a proper measure of total domestic product, for ourselves and, 
derivatively, for our fellow economists.  That the initiatives in that direction involved not the 
cliometric school but individual economists, and then the Elysée, condemns us all:  we fell short 
of our professional responsibilities, doctors at the scene of an accident who sat on their hands 
and let the boy scouts deliver first aid. 
 Our failure to act may be considered another of our failures as economists.  Our failure 
as economic historians is more specific, for we did worse than nothing:  we extended back in 
time the ordinary pseudo-measures of “gross domestic product,” aiding and abetting, as it were, 
the enemy within.  Individuals and more or less extensive teams produced conventional 
“historical national accounts” for one country after another; and they were pulled together and 
extended by Angus Maddison – in his formative professional years an international bureaucrat 
– and his successors’ “Maddison Project.”28  As noted above the series Maddison collected may 
grossly distort the empirical record, and his own contributions were no better; but economists 
                                                 
    26 This paragraph could easily be expanded into a book, but a few points bear immediate notice.  One is 
that the flow account must be complemented by a stock account, with the former incorporating the per-
period changes in the latter; the current product includes investment, by firms and households (as the 
present value of future services), and excludes disinvestment (the drawing down of stocks due to 
obsolescence, catastrophe, depletion, and depreciation:  our fixation with gross rather than net product may 
reflect the original concern with paid employment, or a deeper concern that the available depreciation data 
reflect tax-accounting rules rather than any underlying reality).  Another is that the value of free goods 
cannot be gauged by their market price, sending us back to Dupuit.  In the presence of free goods, it may 
be noted, our “GDP” figures vary in the wrong direction altogether:  the opportunity set of people who 
must arm themselves against a threat, or heat their houses, is smaller than that of those who have no need 
to, ceteris paribus, but their “GDP” is greater.  Our measure should grow, and not decline, as we approach 
Eden, or Marx’s communism.  A third is that consumption externalities may well validate the essential 
message of Easterlin (1974), despite the ambiguity of the evidence it adduces (footnote 25). 
 
    27Nordhaus and Tobin labelled their statistic a “measure of economic welfare,” rather than “a correct 
measure of domestic product.”  That implicitly accepted conventionally measured GDP as correct in its 
own domain, and gave much too much away.  Both environmental damage and the extraction of subsoil 
resources are forms of disinvestment, the drawing down of stocks, to be deducted on utterly standard 
grounds. 
    28 I too have contributed to that literature (Fenoaltea 2005, 2012, 2017a, 2018a, 2018b) –  in the belief 
that if we are to calculate “GDP” at all we should do so without obvious error, and in the certain 
knowledge that the components of our GDP estimates are of interest in their own right –  mais sans être 
dupe (Fenoaltea 2018c). 
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and economic historians take their evidence ready made, and have happily run amok exploiting 
these comptes fantastiques in studies that span the ages and the continents.29  
 Our backcasting of what we call “gross domestic product” is in fact intrinsically 
laughable.  Imagine us in our Valhalla, imagine our conversation with economic historians yet 
unborn, imagine that they ask us what our generation did.  Shall we be allowed to answer “We 
reconstructed the historical national accounts” (“Oh, wow!”)?  Or will Valhalla admit only the 
unvarnished truth?  “We reconstructed the short-term indices of paid-employment-generating-
production that would have helped past governments implement their stabilization policies, had 
they had our statistics and had they had such policies” (“You did what???”).  We cliometricians 
are climate historians who reconstruct not past weather, but past weather forecasts:  we have 
failed, sadly, embarrassingly, even as economic historians.  With luck Valhalla does not exist at 
all, and our embarrassment will end with our death. 
 
 
4.  Envoi 
 
 I have a dream.   
 I dream of a day when economics is not an oxbow off the flow of Western culture, a day 
when economists are educated as well as trained, a day when we understand the nature of what 
we call our “science.”  I dream of a day when the reconstruction of “the data” is recognized for 
the serious, delicate, creative endeavor that it is.  I dream of a day when economic historians’ 
measures of past economies’ aggregate product do not invite ridicule.   
 I dream that we cliometricians can take history and the humanities as seriously as we 
take economics, and lead us to the promised land. 
 Not a threnody, rather a brow-beating, a call to action, a philippic:  mercifully, perhaps, 
at an end.  But I have a dream, and now that you need him James Earl Ray is no longer around. 
                                                 
    29 Two of Maddison’s contributions come particularly to mind.  One is his revision of the early Italian 
estimates for the decades from Unification (1861) to World War I (Maddison 1991; see Fenoaltea 2005).  
He believed these underestimated growth, and that the early backcast figures were correspondingly too 
high.  To increase the measured growth rate he replaced the extant series for industry with one that grew 
much more rapidly, which he constructed using various series I had produced, excluding the estimates 
for the less dynamic artisanal sectors; and he combined his sector series “at 1870 prices,” attributing to 
industry the (large) backcast share implied by Istat’s slowly growing series rather than the far smaller 
share implied by his own (criticisms made and acknowledged prior to publication, in correspondence 
that survives).  The other is his extension of GDP estimates to early times by inferring the surplus over 
subsistence from the urban share of the population:  another fool’s gambit, based on the Whig 
assumption that civilization arose when technical progress generated such a surplus (Fenoaltea 2006), 
and which further assumes that that surplus was consumed entirely as urban goods, and not 
overwhelmingly, as is far more likely, as leisure.  
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